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and providing remedies for fraud in the sale of stocks and bonds.
Two major Texas statutes combat securities fraud: the Texas Securi-
ties Act (TSA) and what is referred to here as the Texas Stock Fraud Act
(TSFA). 1 Although this Article includes Fifth Circuit cases under federal
law, the author has attempted to limit the material to that involving state
law and has touched federal securities law only when necessary. The au-
thor does not intend this Article to exhaust all aspects of securities regu-
lation but rather to update the Texas-based securities practitioner with
developments of interest.
* H. Andy Professor of Commercial Law, St. Mary's University School of Law, San
Antonio, Texas; B.A., 1966, B.S., 1966, M.A., 1969, University of Texas at Austin; Nuc. E.
1969, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Ph.D. (Physics), 1973, J.D. 1975, University of
Texas at Austin.
1. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-1 (Vernon Supp. 2009); TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 27.01 (Vernon Supp. 2009). The TSFA is included in a statute that also
covers real estate fraud, so many of the cases dealing with TSFA's statutory fraud also deal
with real estate. See id. § 27.01.
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I. REGULATION OF SECURITIES
The basic rule of most securities laws is that the issuer must register the
securities with the regulatory agency unless the securities fall within an
exemption to registration. The TSA created a regulatory body, the State
Securities Board (Board), to handle the registrations required by TSA
and to serve as an enforcement mechanism. Enforcement actions gener-
ally focus on issuers' failures to register their securities and their mislead-
ing statements made to aid the sale.
With respect to securities registration, the Board adopted a new rule
that replaced prior securities registration guidelines in nineteen areas
with those of the Statements of Policy (SOP) of the North American Se-
curities Administrators Association (NASAA). 2 The change aimed to
achieve uniformity with other states participating in the NASAA Coordi-
nated State Review programs, to facilitate nationwide registration for
certain issuers,3 and to insure that those issuers could determine if the
SOPs applied to their registrations in Texas. The new rule specifically
referred to the SOPs, and issuers could find and obtain copies of the
SOPs. The new rule's references to the SOPs also required the Board to
repeal those Texas rules that contained the full text of the SOPs to avoid
redundancy and its resulting ambiguity.4
The Eastland Court of Appeals examined the impact on an issuer's
stock option plan of the failure to register underlying securities under
either the TSA or the federal Securities Act.5 In Key Energy Services,
Inc. v. Eustace,6 the court considered whether an employee could exercise
incentive stock options issued under an employer plan during a black-out
period when the registration statement for the underlying stock was inef-
fective. In the past, some enterprising Texas employees have asserted
that they properly exercised their options by providing notice and pay-
2. See 33 Tex. Reg. 8704 (2008), adopted 34 Tex. Reg. 43 (2009) (codified at 7 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE § 113.14) (adopting the new rule without comment).
3. See George Lee Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation, 62 SMU L. REV. 1435, 1440 (2009)
(discussing a recent adoption of the NASAA guidelines for real estate programs).
4. See 33 Tex. Reg. 8704 (2008) (proposing the new rule); see also 33 Tex. Reg. 8704
(2008), adopted 34 Tex. Reg. 43 (2009) (repealing rules 113.14 through 113.25 for registra-
tion of securities); 33 Tex. Reg. 8705 (2008), adopted 34 Tex. Reg. 44 (2009) (repealing
rules 117.1-117.9 containing the administrative guidelines for registration of real estate pro-
grams); 33 Tex. Reg. 8706 (2008), adopted 34 Tex. Reg. 44 (repealing rules 121.1-121.10
containing the administrative guidelines for oil and gas programs); 33 Tex. Reg. 8707,
adopted 34 Tex. Reg. 45 (2009) (repealing rules 129.1-129.9 containing the administrative
guidelines for registration of asset-backed securities); 33 Tex. Reg. 8707 (2008), adopted 34
Tex. Reg. 45 (2009) (repealing rules 133.31-133.32 containing forms concerning real estate
guidelines cross reference sheet and real estate investment trusts guidelines cross reference
sheet); 33 Tex. Reg. 8708 (2008), adopted 34 Tex. Reg. 45 (2009) (repealing rules 141.1-
141.8 containing the administrative guidelines for registration of equipment programs); 33
Tex. Reg. 8708 (2008), adopted 34 Tex. Reg. 46 (2009) (repealing rules 143.1-143.8 contain-
ing the administrative guidelines for registration of real estate investment trusts).
5. Key Energy Servs., Inc. v. Eustace, 290 S.W.3d 332 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2009, no
pet.); see 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2006); TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-1.
6. 290 S.W.3d at 332. This Article omits the issues on wrongful termination, impossi-
bility of contractual performance, and the impact of fault.
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ment during the black-out period and that the employer needed only de-
lay delivery of the stock until after the black-out period.7 In Key Energy
Services, the employee, after termination, used the above procedure to
exercise his options, but the employer refused to issue the underlying
stock even after the expiration of the black-out period. The employee
sued in district court for wrongful termination and recovered an amount
representing the value of the options. The issuer appealed the options
damage award, claiming that the options had expired by their own terms
during the black-out period, which rendered them worthless. Prior to the
employee's attempted exercise of the options,8 the issuer had withdrawn
the effectiveness of its registration statement for the underlying shares by
its failure to file its annual report with the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC). The issuer had also announced to the employees that it
was temporarily suspending the exercise of the incentive stock options as
provided in the plan. The issuer's current report on Form 8-K filed with
the SEC explained that the withdrawal of effectiveness was caused by a
failure to maintain the financial books, some under the control of the
suing employee, in accordance with generally accepted accounting princi-
ples, which mandated a restatement of past financial statements and
delayed the current one.9 Before the issuer completed the restatement
process, the employee's 140,000 options expired along with 1,755,995
other employee options. The incentive stock option plan provided that
the exercise would be effective only if the company counsel determined
that the issuance and delivery of the underlying stock complied with all
applicable laws. The plan also allowed the issuer to delay the effective-
ness of any option exercise to allow issuance of the underlying stock to be
made pursuant to a registration statement or an exemption from registra-
tion. Under the plan the issuer was under no obligation to make effective
any registration under federal or state law.10
The Key Energy Services court presented the securities as whether the
employee could exercise his options during the period without an effec-
tive registration statement and whether the issuer could delay delivery of
the underlying shares until a registration statement was effective. The
court misunderstood the prior opinion of the Houston Fourteenth Court
of Appeals in Walden v. Affiliated Computer Services, Inc.," which alleg-
edly allowed such a procedure, and went to great lengths to distinguish
7. See Walden v. Affiliated Computer Servs., Inc., 97 S.W.3d 303 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied) (Office of Thrift Supervision order prohibiting issuer
from issuing stock); see also George Lee Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation, 56 SMU L. REV.
1995, 2005 (2003) (discussing Walden).
8. The court assumed the employee satisfied the conditions precedent to the exercise
of the options, namely notice and payment. Key Energy Servs., Inc., 290 S.W.3d at 342 n.7.
9. Id. at 343; see generally Fed. Accounting Standards Advisory Bd., Statements of
Federal Financial Accounting Concepts and Standards (June 30, 2009), available at, http://
www.fasab.gov/pdffiles/codification-report2009.pdf.
10. Id. at 335-36, 340-41.
11. 97 S.W.3d 303 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.) 2003, pet. denied).
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that prior opinion.12 Because the Walden court faced a prohibition
against only the issuer and not the option holders, the Key Energy Ser-
vices court emphasized the options as securities separate and apart from
the underlying stock.13 The court noted that the Securities Act's defini-
tion of a security specifically included an option' 4 and that the short-
swing profit liability rules under the Exchange Act' 5 providing disgorge-
ment of a profit from the sale and purchase of a security by an insider
within a six month period' 6 included the grant of an option and the exer-
cise of the option (excluded from the short-swing profit rule by SEC reg-
ulation).' 7 Consequently, the exercise of the options by the option holder
would also be subject to the same registration requirement that pre-
vented the issuer from issuing the underlying stock, thus distinguishing
the case from the Walden situation, where the restriction applied only to
the issuer.' 8 Despite this misunderstanding, the Key Energy Services
court did recognize that the employee's exercise of notice and payment, if
accepted by the issuer with an agreement to delay delivery of the under-
lying stock until a registration statement for the stock became effective,
would amount to a contract of sale as of the date of acceptance.19 The
Securities Act made it unlawful to sell a security, or enter into a contract
to do so, without an effective registration statement or compliance with a
12. The Key Energy Services court believed the Walden court approved the delayed
issuance procedure. See Key Energy Servs., 290 S.W.3d at 343. However, in Walden, the
black-out period expired before the exercise period (by a few hours) so in that brief post-
black-out period the options could be exercised, and the court found the advance notice
and payment acceptable for an issuance in that brief post-black-out period. See Walden, 97
S.W.3d at 327 (discussing an issuer conceded that it could issue stock options exercisable
on Sept. 26, 1997, because the cease and desist order terminated on Sept. 26, 1997, and
determining that, under contract language, options were exercisable until 4:30 p.m. on
Sept. 26, 1997, beyond the options expiration time of 11:59 p.m. of Sept. 25, 1997, as as-
serted by issuer. Cf In re Walkup, 122 S.W.3d 215, 217 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
2003, no pet.) (stating that for "effective on day" court orders, day begins at midnight).
13. Key Energy Servs., 290 S.W.3d at 344.
14. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2006) ("'security' means any ... option"); see also id.
§ 78c(a)(10) (same for the Exchange Act); see also TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-
4(E) (Vernon Supp. 2009) (defining "sale" of a security as including options).
15. See 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2006).
16. See id. § 78p(b) ("[A]ny profit realized by [such beneficial owner, director, or of-
ficer] from any purchase and sale .. . within any period of less than six months, .. . shall
inure to and be recoverable by the issuer . . . .").
17. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-1(b) (West 2009) ("[A] call equivalent position shall mean
a derivative security position . . . including . . . a long call option . . . ."); id. § 240.16a-1(c)
("[D]erivative securities shall mean any option . . . ."); id. § 240.16b-6(a) ("The establish-
ment of ... a call equivalent position . . . shall be deemed a purchase ..... ); id. § 240.16b-
6(b) ("The closing of a derivative security position as a result of its exercise ... shall be
exempt from the operation of section 16(b) . . . .").
18. See Key Energy Servs., 290 S.W.3d at 342. It is doubtful that the sale or disposition
of the option as a security to the issuer is of the type of transaction requiring the protection
of the securities laws since the information to be disclosed is already in the possession of
the issuer. It is also doubtful that the option holder, as an officer of the company, needs
the protection of disclosure afforded by the securities laws, but the option holder did not
assert that any exemption from registration applied. See id. at 342; see also 15 U.S.C.
§ 77b(a)(15) (2006) (defining accredited investor to include officers of the issuer); id.
§ 77d(6) (providing an exemption from registration for accredited investors).
19. Key Energy Servs., 290 S.W.3d at 344.
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registration exemption. 20 Because of this, the issuer would violate the
securities laws, thereby rejecting the exercise, if it entered into the em-
ployee's proposed delayed delivery arrangement. 21 Hence, in Key En-
ergy Services, the options expired worthless, and the court reversed the
lower court's award of lost options damages.22
Key Energy Services and Walden should alert employees holding incen-
tive stock options that those options may not be worth as much as they
had hoped upon grant. The plan under which the issuer issued the op-
tions may provide for periods of non-exercise during which the options
could expire unexercised. During such black-out periods, the best that
option holders can hope for is to provide proper notice and payment (ide-
ally near the end of the option period to avoid a collapse of the price of
the underlying stock) and then hope that the black-out period ceases
before the options expire. Employees should also note that the black-out
period eradicating their options frequently will be under the control of
the issuer such as in Key Energy Services, where the issuer controlled
preparation of the financial statements.
One of the Board's cease and desist orders became the subject of re-
view by the Austin Court of Appeals. In Texas State Securities Board v.
Miller,23 an issuer and its affiliates sold, through seminars, standard in-
vestment contracts for ATM machines coupled with lease-backs under
which the issuer and its affiliates would manage operations and service
the ATM machines with a supposed return of twelve percent. The Board
issued an emergency cease and desist order, which was to last until the
securities and the selling agents were registered.24 The issuer and its affil-
iates challenged the order before the State Office of Administrative
Hearings (SOAH). At the hearing, the Board called as a witness its en-
20. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(3) (2006) ("'[S]ell' shall include every contract of sale or
disposition of a security . . . for value."); id. § 77d ("The provisions of section [15 U.S.C.
§ 77e] shall not apply to . . . [listing transactions exempt from registration]."); id.
§ 77e(a)(1) ("Unless a registration statement is in effect as to a security, it shall be unlawful
for any person . . . to sell such security.. . . "); see also TEX. REV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-4(E)
(Vernon Supp. 2009) ("The term 'sale' means and includes contracts and agreements
whereby securities are sold, traded or exchanged . . . ."); id. art. 581-5 ("[T]he provisions of
this Act shall not apply to the sale of any security when made in any of the following
transactions . . . [listing transactions exempt from registration]."); id. art. 581-7A ("No
dealer or agent shall sell or offer for sale any securities . . . except those which have been
registered . . . .").
21. The Key Energy Services court found support for denying the delayed delivery
procedure from a Third Circuit case. Key Energy Servs., 290 S.W.3d at 343 (citing In re
Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 181 F. App'x 206 (3d Cir. 2006) (similarly refusing option dam-
ages arising during a black-out on the exercise of options due to the necessity to restate
financial statements when confronted with the same proposal to delay delivery of the un-
derlying stock)).
22. Id. at 342-44.
23. No. 03-06-00365-CV, 2009 WL 1896075 (Tex. App.-Austin July 1, 2009, no pet.)
(mem. op.) (J. Jones). The author served with J. Woodfin Jones as a director of the Uni-
versity of Texas Law School's Legal Research Board in 1975.
24. See In re Thell G. Pruett dba Fresh Start Funding Group, No. CDO-1538, 2003 WL
22284602 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Sept. 22, 2003); see also George Lee Flint, Jr., Securities Regula-




forcement director, a long-time employee who had handled the action
against the issuer. The witness testified as to whether the issuer's invest-
ment program constituted a security. The appealing affiliates' attorney
made no objection to the witness's testifying nor to his actual testimony,
although a co-defendant's counsel did. The SOAH confirmed the
Board's order, and the Board later finalized it.25 The appealing affiliates
sought judicial review, and the district court reversed the Board's order,
concluding that allowing the enforcement director to testify was an abuse
of discretion. 26
The Miller court quickly dispatched the abuse of discretion point be-
cause the affiliates' attorney had not preserved the error as required by
law. 2 7 The affiliates' attorney then claimed unwaivable fundamental er-
ror but could support it only with flimsy ideas. The witness had not vio-
lated the Rules of Professional Conduct, which prohibit an advocate
before an adjudicative body from testifying before that body but do not
prevent the witness's assistance in preparation of the case outside the ad-
judicative body as occurred in Miller.28 The witness had not testified on a
pure question of law because whether an investment is a security is a
mixed question of fact and law, and courts allow experts to testify on such
mixed questions.29 The Miller court therefore reversed and remanded.30
The Miller opinion reveals the inadvisability of sending ill-prepared or
inexperienced lawyers to handle hearings before the Board. Such lawyers
need to be well versed both in securities law and civil litigation
procedures.
II. REGISTRATION OF MARKET OPERATORS
One of the underpinnings of state regulation in this area is the require-
ment to register as a seller of securities before selling securities in the
state and as an investment advisor before rendering investment advice.31
25. See In re Thell G. Pruett dba Fresh Start Funding Group, No. ENF-04-CDO-1572,
2004 WL 2314506 (Tex. St. Sec. Bd. Sept. 22, 2004); see also George Lee Flint, Jr., Securities
Regulation, 58 SMU L. REV. 1135, 1143 n.39 (2005) (mentioning Pruett).
26. Miller, 2009 WL 1896075, at *1.
27. Id. at *2-3; see TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2001.081 (Vernon 2007) (stating that in
administrative actions, rules of nonjury civil case in district court apply, with a few excep-
tions); TEX. R. EVID. 103(a) (stating that an error on a ruling excluding evidence cannot be
predicated unless timely objection is made stating the specific ground of the objection).
28. TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDuCr 3.08, reprinted in TEX. GOV'T CODE
ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G app. A (Vernon Supp. 2009) (Tex. State Bar R. art. X, § 9) (lawyer as
witness).
29. Miller, 2009 WL 1896075, at *3; see Bailey v. State, 155 S.W.3d 346, 351 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 2004) (stating that whether a document qualifies as a security depends on
facts, so the jury should have heard expert testimony on circumstances of the particular
document), rev'd on other grounds, 201 S.W.3d 739, 743 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (noting
that an appellate court cannot reverse on grounds not ruled on by the trial court and not
raised on appeal); see also U.S. v. Johnson, 700 F.2d 163, 170, 174-75 (5th Cir. 1983) (sum-
marizing that the definition of a security is a question of law and whether a transaction is a
security is a question of fact for jury).
30. Miller, 2009 WL 1896075, at *2-4.
31. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-13 (Vernon Supp. 2009).
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Registration infractions generally surface when applying or reapplying
for registration.
The Texas Supreme Court achieved the distinction of being one of the
first to interpret the recently amended arbitration rule of the Financial
Industry Regulation Authority (FINRA). Both Texas law and federal law
require registered selling agents to file Form U-4 with the Texas State
Securities Commissioner and FINRA, respectively. 32 That form contains
an arbitration provision referencing FINRA's rules. In In re Next Finan-
cial Group, Inc.,33 the dealer terminated an at-will selling agent for failure
to perform required duties in connection with a FINRA audit. The regis-
tered selling agent, a regional supervisor, claimed the firing occurred be-
cause he refused to conceal a supervised trader's fraudulent churning
transactions as requested by the dealer for the FINRA audit after the
supervisor reported the fraud to the dealer. The terminated selling agent
sued the dealer for wrongful discharge for refusing to commit an illegal
act,34 an action allowed in Texas by judicial precedent.35 The dealer,
lacking any written employment agreement with the selling agent, moved
to compel arbitration based on the arbitration provision contained in the
selling agent's registration application on Form U-4 to which the dealer
was not a signatory. That provision3 6 contained an agreement of the reg-
istered selling agent to arbitrate any dispute between him and his dealer
firm for which the FINRA rules, as amended from time to time, required
arbitration. The district court denied the request to arbitrate, and the
court of appeals denied the dealer's petition for a writ of mandamus.37
The securities issue addressed by the Texas Supreme Court was
whether the amended rules of FINRA required arbitration between the
supervisor and the dealer for wrongful termination. The Court dispensed
with the objection that the third-party beneficiary-dealer could not en-
force the arbitration provision contained in the selling agent's Form U-4,
noting its own opinion allowing a third-party beneficiary to enforce an
arbitration provision and a federal opinion permitting the same for Form
U-4. 38 At the time of the selling agent's hiring, FINRA's arbitration rule
provided for arbitration of claims "arising out of or in connection with
the business of any member . . . or arising out of the employment or
32. See 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 115.2(a)(2) (2010); 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b7-1 (2009).
33. 271 S.W.3d 263 (Tex. 2008). This Article omits the issue on the applicability of the
Federal Arbitration Act.
34. The illegal acts would have been mail and wire fraud. See Brief in Support of
Response, In re Next Fin. Group, 271 S.W.3d 263, 2008 WL 2364234, at *2; see also 18
U.S.C. § 1341 (2006) (stating that mail fraud occurs when a devisor of scheme to defraud
places matter in mail to execute the scheme); id. § 1343 (stating that wire fraud occurs
when a devisor of scheme to defraud transmits communication by wire to execute the
scheme).
35. See Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733, 734-35 (Tex. 1985) (identify-
ing an exception to the usual employment-at-will doctrine).
36. See Item 5, Section 15A, Rev. Form U4 (05/2009).
37. In re Next Fin. Group, 271 S.W.3d at 265-66.
38. Id. at 267; see In re Palm Harbor Homes, Inc., 195 S.W.3d 672, 677 (Tex. 2006); In
re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practice Litig., 133 F.3d 225, 230 (3d Cir. 1998).
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termination of employment."39 Before FINRA absorbed the enforce-
ment arm of the New York Stock Exchange, 4 0 FINRA amended its arbi-
tration rules to provide for arbitration of a claim that "arises out of the
business activities of a member." 4 1 The selling agent first contended that
the deletions of "in connection with" and "termination of employment"
from the arbitration rule meant that the amendment narrowed the scope
of the arbitration requirement to exclude his lawsuit. 4 2 With respect to
the first deletion, the Texas Supreme Court noted that in Texas, "arises
out of" is broadening language, not narrowing language. 4 3 With respect
to the deletion of employment termination, the Court noted that the
SEC, with respect to FINRA's amended arbitration procedure, specifi-
cally stated that employment termination claims would continue to be
covered by FINRA's arbitration rule.4 4 Moreover, the FINRA rules con-
tained an exception to arbitration for lawsuits alleging employment dis-
crimination in violation of a statute,45 meaning that without the
exception, the employment discrimination lawsuits would be included
under the rule for arbitration.4 6 The selling agent then contended that his
lawsuit involving wrongful discharge for refusing to commit an illegal act
fell within the statutory employment discrimination exception to arbitra-
tion. The Court noted that wrongful discharge did not involve discrimi-
nation, nor was it statutory.47 Additionally, the SEC had specifically
stated that the exception did not apply to causes of action created by
judicial precedent, such as the Texas cause of action, without an associ-
ated claim of discrimination protected by a specific statute. 4 8
In re Next Financial Group should alert registered brokers and dealers
to the arbitration agreements contained in their state and federal registra-
tions. Those arbitration agreements are subject to the rules of FINRA.
39. In re Next Fin. Group, 271 S.W.3d at 267 (quoting 58 Fed. Reg. 39070 (July 21,
1993) (proposed rule) and citing 58 Fed. Reg. 45932 (Aug. 31, 1993) (SEC order approving
the rule)).
40. FINRA, About the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, http://www.finra.org/
AboutFINRAlindex/htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2010).
41. See Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., FINRA Manual, Rule 13200 (effective Dec. 15,
2008); see also 70 Fed. Reg. 36430-01 (June 25, 2005) (noting the text of changes on a URL
and describing the substantive changes within, none of which affect Rule 13200).
42. There is some authority for the proposition that the language "arising out of" is
narrower than "in connection with." See Tracer Research Corp. v. Nat'l Envtl. Servs. Co.,
42 F.3d 1292, 1295 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that "arising out" is narrower than "relating to"
in arbitration clauses).
43. In re Next. Fin. Group, 271 S.W.3d at 268-69; see Utica Nat'l Ins. Co. of Tex. v. Am.
Indem. Co., 141 S.W.3d 198, 203 (Tex. 2004) (involving an insurance contract); Red Ball
Motor Freight, Inc., v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of Wis., 189 F.2d 374, 378 (5th Cir.
1951) (involving an insurance contract).
44. In re Next Fin. Group, 271 S.W.3d at 267-68; see 72 Fed. Reg. 45077 (Aug. 10, 2007)
(considering the New York Stock Exchange's interim arbitration rule after its absorption in
FINRA).
45. See Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., FINRA Manual, Rule 13201 (effective Dec. 15,
2008).
46. In re Next Fin. Group, 271 S.W.3d at 269-70.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 267-70; see 62 Fed. Reg. 66164 (Dec. 17, 1997).
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The rules provide that all disputes between the registered selling agents
and their employing dealers are subject to arbitration, with only the nar-
row exception of employment discrimination in violation of a statute. 49
III. SECURITIES FRAUD
One of the major reasons legislatures passed securities acts was to facil-
itate investors' actions to recover their money through a simplified fraud
action that removed the most difficult elements to prove in a common
law fraud action, namely scienter and privity. However, these Securities
Act actions generally apply only to the primary market, so when investors
purchase in the secondary market, their actions reintroduce these obsta-
cles. Moreover, Congress has added additional burdens to the secondary
market securities fraud action through the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act (PLSRA) of 1995.50
A. COURT DECISIONS UNDER THE TEXAS ACTS
Federal courts, through their diversity and removal jurisdictions, also
deal with securities fraud lawsuits brought under the Texas acts. Their
opinions under the TSA and TSFA have raised two issues of interest.
1. Failure to Satisfy the Buried Facts Doctrine for Materiality Under
the TSA
One federal bankruptcy court considered the adequacy of disclosure
under the TSA. In In re Perry,51 limited partners purchased class B lim-
ited partnership interests from an existing limited partnership engaged in
the sourcing, planning, and development of real estate assets ranging
from commercial office buildings to retail and single-family lot develop-
ment. Included in its assets was equity in another limited partnership
whose investments were controlled by an investment committee. The
limited partners claimed they had been induced to purchase the limited
partnership interests by a prospectus that contained material omissions
and, thus, under the TSA, they had the right to rescind their purchases. 52
The purported omissions were the failure to disclose in the prospectus
that (1) the class A limited partners could transfer their interests amongst
themselves, which led investors to believe a tripartite management would
manage the partnership indefinitely and (2) the general partner could re-
place members of the investment committee with partnership employees.
The debtor in the chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization action, an indi-
vidual, was the chief executive officer of the limited partnership and a
49. Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., FINRA Manual, Rules 13200-01 (effective Dec. 15,
2008).
50. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2006).
51. 404 B.R. 196 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009).
52. The TSA provides that a person who sells a security by omitting a material fact




"control person" of the general partner of the limited partnership.53 The
limited partners filed bankruptcy claims against the debtor contending
that the debtor, as a control person, was liable for the stated omissions.54
The bankruptcy court denied their claims, finding the alleged omissions
were not material.55
The Perry court noted that a material omission under the TSA requires
"a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would consider it im-
portant in deciding to invest." 5 6 In the Fifth Circuit, the objective stan-
dard of the reasonable investor imputes knowledge of the contents of the
disclosure documents to the investor5 7 and weighs that disclosure in its
context-whether the method of presentation obscures or distorts the sig-
nificance of material facts (the buried facts doctrine).58 Applying this
standard, the bankruptcy court found the two alleged omissions ade-
quately disclosed in the prospectus. 59 The prospectus made it clear that
the general partner, not the class A partners, managed the limited part-
nership.60 The prospectus included a conspicuously bolded risk factor
about dependence on key personnel of the general partner, a second con-
spicuous risk factor about the potential non-involvement of one class A
limited partner, numerous provisions instructing investors to review the
included limited partnership agreement which contained the buy/sell pro-
vision allowing class A limited partners to transfer their interests among
themselves, and a conspicuously bolded section of the summary of the
limited partnership agreement which included a description of the buy/
sell provision.61 The management and investment committee sections of
the prospectus also made it clear that the general partner, not the invest-
53. The TSA provides that control persons, those directly or indirectly in control of a
perpetrator of securities fraud, are jointly and severally liable with the perpetrator. See
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33(F)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2009). The debtor stipulated
he was a control person of the general partner of the limited partnership. Perry, 404 B.R.
at 212 n.2.
54. The Bankruptcy Code has a provision that prevents shareholders from using their
securities law right to rescind for securities fraud from using that rescission to elevate their
interest in the bankrupt's estate to that of a general creditor with priority over the other
shareholders. See 11 U.S.C. § 510(b) (2006) (subordinating such claims to those of the
general creditors). The provision, however, only applies to issuer debtors and their affili-
ates. The definition of affiliates specifically excludes limited partnerships. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(2) (2006) (defining affiliate as twenty percent ownership in a corporation); id.
§ 101(a) (defining corporation to exclude limited partnerships).
55. Perry, 404 B.R. at 199-213.
56. Id. at 213 (quoting Weatherly v. Deloitte & Touche, 905 S.W.2d 642, 649-50 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, writ dism'd w.o.j.)).
57. Id. at 214 (citing Isquith v. Middle S. Util., Inc., 847 F.2d 186, 201 (5th Cir. 1988)
and listing numerous opinions from other circuits to a similar effect); see also Mercury Air
Group, Inc. v. Mansour, 237 F.3d 542, 547 (5th Cir. 2001). The Isquith court reversed a
district court that found the alleged omissions in the disclosure documents because the
district court neglected to consider the context in which the issuer made the proper disclo-
sures. Isquith, 847 F.2d at 200 n.9.
58. Perry, 404 B.R. at 216 n.6 (citing a FSLIC opinion and decisions from other cir-
cuits); see also Isquith, 847 F.2d at 201-03 (adopting the doctrine in the Fifth Circuit).
59. Perry, 404 B.R. at 210.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 215-18.
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ment committee, controlled the entity that made decisions for the affili-
ated limited partnership. 62
Perry shows both investors and their lawyers the importance of reading
the disclosure documents: investors, so they will know what they are
purchasing, and lawyers, so they will not appear to be fools before the
judge. Perry was not a case where the issuer buried the material informa-
tion in a manner to obscure the disclosure-it highlighted the material
information with many cautionary warnings.
2. Attempt to Impose Federal "Loss Causation" Under the TSFA
A federal district court ruled on a motion for summary judgment in an
aiding and abetting claim under the TSFA in In re Enron Corp. Securities,
Derivative & "ERISA" Litigation.6 3 In that case, a financial bank entered
into a number of transactions with Enron, and the bank's employees were
aware that Enron accounted for the transactions to misrepresent Enron's
financials. The financial bank failed to disclose the Enron misrepresenta-
tions and benefitted from that undisclosed falsity through increased busi-
ness fees and future business. Enron had numerous similar transactions
with other entities. The investors purchased a number of Enron securi-
ties from entities other than Enron and retained these securities through
Enron's collapse. The investors brought this action under the TSFA
among other claims against the financial bank for aiding and abetting.64
The financial bank moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the
investors could not show causation, that is, that the financial bank's si-
lence had caused their damages.65 The district court denied the motion.66
The securities issue the district court confronted was how to apply cau-
sation for an aider and abettor under the TSFA in a complex situation
62. Id. at 218-19.
63. 623 F. Supp. 2d 798 (S.D. Tex. 2009). This Article omits the issues on civil conspir-
acy. The district court had previously dismissed claims under the TSA. Id. at 805 n.3; see
also In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig., 540 F. Supp. 2d 759, 797-99
(S.D. Tex. 2007); George Lee Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation, 61 SMU L. REV. 1107, 1128
(2008) (discussing Enron).
64. Enron, 623 F. Supp. 2d at 805-08. See also TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 27.01(b) (Vernon 2009) ("A person who ... commits the fraud described in Subsection
(a) of this section . . . is liable to the person defrauded for actual damages."); § 27.01(d)
("A person who (1) has actual awareness of the falsity of a representation ... made by
another person and (2) fails to disclose the falsity of the representation . . . to the person
defrauded, and (3) benefits from the false representation . . . commits the fraud described
,in Subsection (a) of this section and is liable to the person defrauded for exemplary dam-
ages."); Glazener v. Jansing, 2003 WL 22207226, at *5-6 (Tex. App.-Austin 2003, no pet.)
(mem. op.) (finding an aider and abettor liable for both actual and exemplary damages
under the TSFA).
65. Enron, 623 F. Supp. 2d at 814. Texas courts recognize the TSFA action as differing
from common law fraud only in that the investors need not prove scienter, so proximate
cause is a requirement. See Robbins v. Capozzi, 100 S.W.3d 18, 26 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2002,
no pet.) (real estate fraud: "caused an injury"); Larsen v. Carlene Langford & Assocs., Inc.,
41 S.W.3d 245, 249 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001, pet. denied) (real estate fraud: "which caused
an injury"); Scott v. Sebree, 986 S.W.2d 364, 371 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, pet. denied)
(real estate fraud: "resulting in damages").
66. Enron, 623 F. Supp. 2d at 805 n.3, 807 n.6, 814, 819, 827.
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with possibly multiple aiders and abettors. The financial bank insisted
that the investors had to show what portion of their loss was attributable
to the financial bank's wrongdoing, which, due to the myriad of other
possible factors causing the Enron collapse, required competent expert
testimony, and the investors had provided none. Such a "loss causation"
requirement is appropriate under federal securities law for primary viola-
tors.6 7 The investors countered that under the TSFA, causation is with
respect to the primary violator, not the secondary aider and abettor.
They claimed that the aider and abettor has the same liability as the pri-
mary violator, and the lay testimony on causation the investors had pro-
vided for the primary violator was sufficient.68 The district court agreed
with the financial bank that it was liable for losses caused only by the
fraudulent transactions of Enron of which it was aware. 69 But as to cau-
sation, Texas law recognizes that there may be more than one cause of an
event70 and so finds causation satisfied if the perpetrator's acts were a
substantial factor in bringing about the injury.7' The district court found,
in light of the evidence concerning the magnitude of the financial bank's
loans to Enron presented by the investors, that a reasonable person could
infer that the bank's transactions with Enron were a substantial factor in
causing the investors' injuries. 72
Although the investors in Enron avoided showing "loss causation"
(showing which portion of the investors' loss derived from the perpetra-
tor's acts), the issue may reappear in the calculation of damages. The
issue is whether the aider and abettor is liable under the TSFA for all
damages caused by the primary violator or only that portion of the dam-
ages derived from the aider and abettor's acts. The TSFA, not designed
with multiple aiders and abettors in mind, seems to support the investors.
The aider and abettor is jointly and severally liable, presumably with the
right of contribution from the other aiders and abettors, although the dis-
trict court in Enron seemed to lean toward limiting a particular aider and
abettor's damages.
B. COURT DECISIONS UNDER THE FEDERAL Acrs
Since the fraud provisions of the TSA are modeled on the federal stat-
utes,73 there is an interest in Fifth Circuit securities law opinions. Origi-
nally, this meant Texas courts interpreting the TSA's similar language
67. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2006) (imposing a "loss causation" element to class
action securities fraud cases); Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487
F.3d 261, 265 (5th Cir. 2007) (imposing in the Fifth Circuit a "loss causation" requirement
before application of the fraud-on-the-market presumption for the reliance element).
68. Id.
69. Enron, 623 F. Supp. 2d at 828.
70. See, e.g., Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Perez, 819 S.W.2d 470, 471 (Tex. 1991).
71. See, e.g., Union Pump Co. v. Albritton, 898 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex. 1995), abrogated
on other grounds, Ford Motor Co. v. Ledesma, 242 S.W.3d 32 (Tex. 2007).
72. Enron, 623 F. Supp. 2d at 814-22, 828.




would look to federal decisions under the federal statutes.74 But more
recently, litigants and judges have tended to graft federal concepts onto
the TSA, even when the language is not similar.75
1. Pleading "Loss Causation" Under the PSLRA
The most frequent issue for the Fifth Circuit under the federal acts
deals with developing rules for "loss causation" pursuant to the U.S. Su-
preme Court's Dura PharmaceuticalS76 decision. For the Fifth Circuit the
issue of "loss causation" enters the lawsuit at two points. First, the court's
implied private cause of action for damages from securities fraud, under
the PLSRA,77 has "loss causation" as one of its elements.7 8 Second, the
Fifth Circuit requires a finding of "loss causation" before allowing substi-
tution of the fraud-on-the-market theory's rebuttable presumption for
the reliance element of the cause of action.7 9
a. As an Element of the Cause of Action
In Catogas v. Cyberonics, Inc.,80 the Fifth Circuit determined that the
"loss causation" element requires tying the specific corrective disclosure
to an immediate decline in stock price. The issuer's management
backdated and repriced executive stock options, thereby rendering prior
financial statements misleading by not reporting the stock-based compen-
sation as an expense. The corrective statements included an analyst's re-
port raising questions about certain stock options granted, an SEC
informal inquiry into the matter, a U.S. attorney's subpoena of docu-
ments, an announcement of the appointment of an internal audit commit-
tee to investigate the matter, a press release announcing a delay in filing
the issuer's annual report on Form 10-K to the SEC in light of the inter-
nal investigation, and a press release stating that the issuer had received a
letter from NASDAQ that the issuer was subject to delisting if it did not
file its Form 10-K. On the days of disclosure, only the last disclosure
involved a significant decline in stock price. The earlier disclosures in-
74. See, e.g., Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int'l, Inc. v. Haskel, 193 S.W.3d 87, 103 n.13
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied); see also George Lee Flint, Jr., Securi-
ties Regulation, 60 SMU L. REV. 1293, 1300-01 (2007) (discussing Anglo-Dutch Petroleum).
75. See In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig., 623 F. Supp. 2d 798,
815-16 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (representing a failed attempt to graft federal "loss causation" onto
the TSFA); see also Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d 333, 343-44 (5th Cir. 2008)
(applying the federal rules for pleading fraud with particularity to the TSA and TSFA);
Flint, supra note 7, at 2005 (discussing Dorsey).
76. See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 339 (2005).
77. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2006).
78. See Dura Pharms., 544 U.S. at 341 (stating that the cause of action requires (1) a
material misrepresentation or omission, (2) scienter, (3) a connection with a purchase or
sale of a security, (4) reliance, (5) economic loss, and (6) "loss causation", that is, a causal
connection between the material misrepresentation and the loss). The latter two elements
come from the PSLRA. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2006).
79. See Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 265 (5th
Cir. 2007) (per curiam); see also Flint, supra note 63, at 1128-29 (discussing Oscar).
80. 292 F. App'x 311, 314 (5th Cir. 2008).
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volved price declines of one to two percent, while the last disclosure in-
volved a price decline of twenty-five percent. The district court had
dismissed the investor's complaint for not sufficiently pleading facts to
raise a strong inference of scienter, a different element of the cause of
action.8'
Rather than investigate the scienter pleading matter, the Catogas court
focused on an alternative ground of "loss causation" to affirm the district
court. Seizing on language in a recent U.S. Supreme Court pronounce-
ment on "loss causation" for securities fraud,82 the Fifth Circuit deter-
mined that the "loss causation" requirement is not satisfied unless there is
a price decline immediately following the corrective disclosure.83 Exam-
ining only the price declines on the day of the disclosures, 84 the Fifth
Circuit found only one significant price decline-the last one.8 5 And that
allegedly corrective disclosure revealed no new information about the op-
tion grants. The only mention of the stock options in that disclosure re-
ferred to disclosures in prior announcements. The Fifth Circuit had
previously determined that statements confirmatory of prior statements
cannot constitute a corrective disclosure. 86 Moreover, the only new dis-
closure contained in the last release involved the delisting, which, al-
though caused by the delay in filing the Form 10-K brought about by the
erroneous stock option accounting, touched only the earlier fraudulent
statements. 87 It did nothing to correct the inaccuracy of the prior mis-
statements or bring to light any new fraud of the issuer.88
Under Catogas, an issuer might escape liability for a private securities
fraud action if the disclosures can be made vague enough so as not to
cause a significant price decline until the new issue of delisting causes the
81. Catogas, 292 F. App'x at 311-13. The PSLRA added the scienter pleading require-
ment to the scienter element of the cause of action. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2).
82. See Catogas, 292 F. App'x at 314 (focusing on Dura Pharmaceuticals' aside: "The
complaint's failure to claim that Dura's share price fell significantly after the truth became
known suggests that the plaintiffs considered the allegation of purchase price inflation
alone sufficient."). The Supreme Court in Dura Pharmaceuticals made it clear it ruled
only on the inconsistency of the Ninth Circuit's approach to "loss causation" allowing price
inflation to satisfy the requirement. See Dura Pharms., 544 U.S. at 346 ("[W]e find the
Ninth Circuit's approach inconsistent . . . . We need not, and do not, consider other proxi-
mate cause or loss-related questions."). The Supreme Court, however, did cite approvingly
the Restatement of Torts, which does have the thought seized by the Fifth Circuit. See
Dura Pharms., 544 U.S. at 344 ("Indeed, the Restatement of Torts, in setting forth the
judicial consensus, says that a person who 'misrepresents the financial condition of a corpo-
ration in order to sell its stock' becomes liable to a relying purchaser 'for the loss' the
purchaser sustains 'when the facts . . . become generally known' and 'as a result' share
value 'depreciate[s].' § 548A, comment b, at 107.").
83. Catogas, 292 F. App'x at 316-17.
84. The price declines were determined by judicial notice. Id. at 316 (citing In re
Merck & Co., Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 261, 265 n.3 (3d Cir. 2005)).
85. See id. at 317 (Speculating that the investors did not use the earlier corrective
statements for the "loss causation" requirement because the respective price drops were
insignificant.).
86. Id. at 314 (citing Greenberg v. Crossroads Sys., Inc., 364 F.3d 657, 663 (5th Cir.
2004)); see also Flint, supra note 25, at 1156-57 (discussing Greenberg).




significant price decline. The matter of delisting is in the control of the
issuer.89
In Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc.,90 the Fifth Circuit dealt with the
pleading standard for "loss causation" and the connection between the
corrective disclosure and the fraud. The issuer became an affiliate of a
telecommunications company with the exclusive right to provide the tele-
communications company's products and services in a multi-state region.
The first set of problematic transactions dealt with the affiliation. The
telecommunications company had several types of affiliates. The issuer's
affiliation allowed the issuer to have control over its operations and cus-
tomer base that the issuer's management believed was essential to its suc-
cess. The telecommunications company desired to change the affiliation
to one in which the telecommunications company had control of the is-
suer's customer care, servicing, and billing. The telecommunications
company applied economic pressure to achieve the change in affiliation,
such as threatening exorbitant fees, contractual breach, and withholding
of product. 91 Ultimately the issuer's management agreed to the new affil-
iation, even though it had vigorously fought the change in affiliation and
knew the change would end the issuer's business plan that had been suc-
cessful in the past. Throughout this time period, the issuer conducted
several stock offerings to fund its acquisitions, and some of the issuer's
managers sold most of their shares. The securities disclosures touted the
affiliation and did not disclose any risks with respect to ceding control
over the issuer's customer care and billing.
The second set of problematic transactions involved subprime-credit
customers. 92 The telecommunications company originally required this
class of customers to pay deposits as a condition of subscription. The
telecommunications company decided to go to a no-deposit, spending-
limit account for the subprime-credit customers. The issuer's past experi-
ence with this customer class indicated that the policy change would lead
to customers' dropping service and an increase in bad debt. The issuer's
management so informed the telecommunications company. The securi-
ties disclosures, however, spoke positively with respect to the no-deposit
program. When the truth about customers' dropping service and about
an increase in bad debt leaked out in connection with the sub-
prime-credit customer situation over a two-month period, the issuer's
stock price plunged by eighty percent. The investors brought a class ac-
tion for securities fraud under Rule 10b-5. 9 3 The district court dismissed
the action, ruling that some of the alleged misrepresentations were pro-
tected by the PSLRA's safe harbor for forward-looking statements and
89. See NASDAQ Manual, Marketplace Rules, Rule 4310(c)(14) (requiring listed issu-
ers to file copies of SEC filings with NASDAQ and deeming electronic filings with the SEC
as satisfying the requirement).
90. 565 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. 2009) (arising in Louisiana).
91. Id. at 233-34.
92. Id. at 234.
93. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009).
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that the investors failed to sufficiently plead "loss causation." 94 The Fifth
Circuit affirmed the dismissal with respect to the affiliation claims, but
reversed with respect to the subprime-credit claims.95
The Fifth Circuit found that the PSLRA's safe harbor provision did not
protect the alleged forward-looking misrepresentations for two reasons.96
The safe harbor provides that the fraud action is not actionable to the
extent the statement is identified as forward looking, is accompanied by
meaningful cautionary statements, is immaterial, or the investors have
failed to plead that the forward-looking statement was made with actual
knowledge that the statement was false.9 7 The district court had ignored
the Lormand investors' pleading that the issuer's management knew their
statements were false.98 The cautionary statements consisted of a general
disclaimer that the documents were not guarantees of future performance
and that they involved known and unknown risks. These boilerplate pro-
visions did not amount to meaningful cautionary language since they
lacked substantive company-specific warnings based on a realistic
description of the risks applicable to particular circumstances. 99 The is-
suer put forth disclaimers contained in other documents containing the
same misrepresentations, but again the Fifth Circuit found these state-
ments warned only of a "limited, general, and vague risk." 1" Having
found material misstatements, the Fifth Circuit considered the "strong in-
ference" of scienter that the district court had not reached and found this
requirement satisfied also. 101 The pleadings quoted the issuer's manage-
ment's disapproval and protestations to the telecommunications company
concerning both the affiliation coercion and the subprime no-deposit
policy.
The issues with respect to the "loss causation" element for the Lor-
mand court were the appropriate pleading standard and the relationship
between the fraud and the disclosure. For the pleading standard, the
Fifth Circuit applied the principles of Rule 8, rather than the stricter re-
quirements of Rule 9, since the Supreme Court used the "short and
plain" pleading of Rule 8 for the "loss causation" element in Dura
94. Lormand, 565 F.3d at 238.
95. Id. at 268.
96. Id. at 244.
97. See 15 U.S.C. §H 78u-5(c)(1)(A), 5(c)(1)(B) (2006).
98. Lormand, 565 F.3d at 243-44 (citing its prior ruling in Southland Sec. Corp. v.
INSpire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 371-72 (5th Cir. 2004) as applying the clause
similarly); see also Flint, supra note 25, at 1155-56 (discussing Southland).
99. Lormand, 565 F.3d at 244-45 (citing its prior ruling in Plotkin v. IP Axess, Inc., 407
F.3d 690, 694 (5th Cir. 2005) as finding similar boilerplate language as not meaningfully
cautionary); see also George Lee Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation, 59 SMU L. REv. 1543,
1560-61 (2006) (discussing Plotkin).
100. Lormand, 565 F.3d at 246. The issuer's management had another argument for the
Fifth Circuit to affirm the district court's decision. It argued it was under no duty to dis-
close. The Fifth Circuit quickly dismissed this argument, noting that in the Fifth Circuit
under Rule 10b-5 a duty to speak the full truth arises when a speaker undertakes a duty to
say anything. See id. at 249 (citing Rubenstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 170 (5th Cir. 1994)).
101. Id. at 239-55.
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Pharmaceuticals.1 0 2 For Rule 8, the Fifth Circuit obtained the sub-ele-
ments of "loss causation" from Dura Pharmaceuticals and the plausibility
standard from Twombly.103 Investors must allege both a misrepresenta-
tion or omission, followed by a disclosure or leaking out of the relevant
truth that caused a significant depreciation of the investor's stock, and
sufficient facts giving rise to a reasonable expectation that discovery will
reveal evidence of the sub-elements. Applying these pleading standards,
the court in Lormand found the pleadings for the affiliation claims defi-
cient since the investors had not alleged any disclosures with respect to
the affiliation misrepresentations. 10 4 For the subprime-credit claims, the
misrepresentations consisted of press releases noting gains in subscrip-
tions, a conference call stating the issuer could reach the subprime-credit
customers profitably, reports of favorable increases in subscriber growth,
and an SEC filing stating that cancelled subscriptions and debt collection
were consistent with historical norms. The disclosures included a warning
issued by another affiliate of the telecommunications company, subse-
quent analysts' downgrades, a press release of second-quarter results in-
dicating significant subscriber cancellations, a credit rating service placing
the issuer's rating on review for possible downgrade, a press release
about weak demand due to requiring deposits from, and high disconnects
among, subprime-credit customers, and an SEC filing reporting a high
disconnect due to adding credit-challenged customers during the year
that elected not to continue or were dropped for nonpayment. The dis-
closure allegations were accompanied by the stock price drops occurring
during the two-month period in which the disclosures took place. The
Fifth Circuit found that these alleged facts provided the required
plausibility.10 5
The Fifth Circuit then addressed three shortcomings in the district
court's analysis.106 First, Dura Pharmaceuticals required that the disclo-
sures must reveal the relevant truth about the fraud.107 The Lormand
102. Id. at 255-58. Rule 8 requires "a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief." See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 9 provides, "In
alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constitut-
ing fraud or mistake." FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b). The Supreme Court in Dura Pharmaceuticals
did not specify which rule applied. It, however, applied Rule 8 since the claim could not
even satisfy the lower standard of that rule.
And we assume, at least for argument's sake, that neither the Rules nor the
securities statutes impose any special further requirement in respect to the
pleading of proximate causation or economic loss. But, even so, the 'short
and plain statement' must provide the defendant with 'fair notice of what the
plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.' . . . The complaint
before us fails this simple test.
Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 47 (1957).
103. Lormand, 565 F.3d at 256-58; see Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557-60
(2007) (imposing the plausibility standard on anti-trust pleadings under Rule 8).
104. Lormand, 565 F.3d at 258.
105. Id. at 260.
106. Id. at 264-66.
107. See Dura Pharms., 544 U.S. at 342, 346.
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court related this requirement to the relevance test under the Federal
Rules of Evidence-that the truth disclosed must make the existence of
the actionable fraud more probable than it would be without the alleged
fact.' 08 Using this relevance test, the Fifth Circuit found, with respect to
the first shortcoming, that the district court ignored disclosures not made
by the issuer and its management. 109 The Fifth Circuit noted that nothing
bars proving "loss causation" by circumstantial evidence, so third-party
disclosure is sufficient. Second, the district court ignored partial disclo-
sures.' 10 The Fifth Circuit found the partial disclosures, when combined
with other disclosures, as satisfying the plausibility standard. 1' Third,
the district court ignored disclosures that did not contradict prior misrep-
resentations. The Fifth Circuit noted this method does not work for
omissions.112
The Lormand opinion has made clear that the pleading standard for
the "loss causation" element is the short and plain, plausible standard of
Rule 8.113 The opinion also indicates that third parties may be the source
of the disclosure, and disclosure may be a series of partial disclosures
over a short period of time.114
b. As a Prerequisite to the Fraud-on-the-Market Presumption
The Fifth Circuit also considered the type of corrective disclosure re-
quired by "loss causation" for both the element of the cause of action and
for class certification for the fraud-on-the-market presumption. In
Alaska Electrical Pension Fund v. Flowserve Corp.,115 the issuer made a
number of misrepresentations over time concerning earnings forecasts,
historical financial performance, costs and savings related to acquisitions,
and debt covenant compliance. The issuer's press release overstated an-
nual earnings by 140%, and the issuer subsequently released inaccurate
quarterly earnings statements.116 Certain releases also contained overly
optimistic earnings guidance for the following year. When the issuer re-
vised the earnings guidance downward, the stock price declined, first in
the following July by thirty-seven percent and then in the following Sep-
tember by thirty-eight percent. When the issuer announced the restated
earnings for those years, a year and a half later, there was no significant
stock price decline. The investors brought an action for securities fraud
and moved to certify a class. The issuer moved for summary judgment.
The district court denied the class certification because the two state-
ments followed by significant stock price declines were not corrective
108. Lormand, 565 F.3d at 256 n.20 (citing FED. R. EviD. 401).
109. Id. at 264.
110. Id. (citing Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 390-91 & n.30 (1983)
(inferring scienter in a securities fraud action by circumstantial evidence)).
111. Id. at 264-65.
112. Id. at 266.
113. Id. at 255-58.
114. Id. at 264.
115. 572 F.3d 221 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
116. Id. at 225-26.
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statements.117 The two earnings guidance revisions did not reveal any
prior earnings guidance as fraudulent and did not relate to any other mis-
statements. Then concluding that the "loss causation" issue determined
for the class certification was dispositive of the "loss causation" element
for the securities fraud action, the district court granted the issuer's sum-
mary judgment motion." 8
The securities issue for the Fifth Circuit in Alaska Electrical Pension
Fund was the definition of corrective information for purposes of deter-
mining "loss causation." The issuer asserted a fact-for-fact standard
where the corrective statement fully corrected prior misstatements. The
Fifth Circuit rejected the issuer's definition because an issuer can immu-
nize itself from liability merely by refusing to admit any falsity in prior
misstatements or by a protracted series of partial disclosures." 9 The in-
vestors urged a true financial condition standard to apply where any dis-
closure of a weakening financial condition, regardless of whether the
disclosure corrects past misstatements, relates to earlier misstatements.
The Fifth Circuit rejected the investors' definition since undisclosed infor-
mation cannot drive the stock price down.120 The standard adopted by
the Fifth Circuit is that the disclosed information must reflect part of the
relevant truth obscured by the fraudulent statements.121 As examples of
the standard, the Fifth Circuit used two of its prior cases. In Greenberg v.
Crossroads Systems, Inc., the Fifth Circuit found a subsequent press re-
lease predicting a significant revenue shortfall in the third quarter as cor-
rective of misstatements pertaining to third quarter earnings, but not
corrective of misstatements pertaining to the first and second quarters,
even though first and second quarter shortfalls surely caused some third
quarter shortfalls. 122 In Lormand, the Fifth Circuit found disclosures
making clear there were substantial problems in that market as corrective
of misstatements about success in the subprime market, but not correc-
tive of misstatements pertaining to becoming an affiliate of a respected
company, even though the affiliation was the reason for being in the sub-
prime market.123 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit vacated the denial of class
certification and remanded.124 Although determination of "loss causa-
tion" for class certification purposes does not resolve the issue for the
securities fraud action, since the district court applied the wrong standard
for "loss causation," the Fifth Circuit also reversed the grant of summary
judgment.125
117. Id. at 224-25.
118. Id. at 225-27, 231, 233.
119. Id. at 230.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. 364 F.3d 657, 667-69 (5th Cir. 2004); see also Flint, supra note 25, at 1156-57 (dis-
cussing Greenberg).
123. See Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 260-61 (5th Cir. 2009).
124. Alaska Elec. Pension Fund, 572 F.3d at 228, 235.
125. Id. at 228-32, 235. The case involved an initial issuance of stock, so the investors
also sued for statutory securities fraud under the Securities Act for misrepresentations in a
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Although the Fifth Circuit in Alaska Electrical Pension Fund did not
further immunize issuers and issuer management from private securities
fraud damage actions by adopting a fact-for-fact disclosure, the investors
have yet to succeed. The investors' action has only been returned to the
district court for application of the Fifth Circuit's new definition of a cor-
rective statement with respect to class certification. The investors have
plenty of time to run afoul of other Fifth Circuit rules for private securi-
ties fraud damage actions, and the Fifth Circuit may concoct additional
rules to thwart the investors.
The Fifth Circuit lastly dealt with the application of the circuit's rule for
"loss causation" when the corrective statement is intermingled with other
negative news. In Fener v. Operating Engineers Construction Industry &
Miscellaneous Pension Fund,126 the investors claimed a newspaper en-
gaged in a fraudulent scheme to artificially inflate circulation to gain ad-
ditional advertising revenue via circulation target bonuses, rigged
circulation audits, and a no-return policy for distributors' unsold newspa-
pers. The issuer announced future circulation would be down about three
percent. Five months later, after stock market hours, the issuer issued a
press release announcing those circulation declines projecting future cir-
culation declines of five to ten percent, and disclosing that the issuer had
begun curtailing circulation manipulation.12 7 The next trading day saw a
seven percent decline in the issuer's stock price. Analysts lowered their
earnings estimates for the issuer and downgraded the stock. The issuer
later announced it would pay advertisers $23 million plus $3 million for
the issuer's internal investigation. The investors brought a private securi-
ties fraud damage action and the investors moved to certify a class. Both
sides presented expert testimony. The issuer's expert's event study di-
vided the corrective press release into three parts, covering fraudulent
overstatements, changes in the issuer's methodology, and industry-wide
declines.128 Upon examining 132 analyst reports, the expert concluded
that the stock price decline primarily resulted from non-fraudulent disclo-
sures, so he testified that the investors could not show the press release
disclosures were the primary cause of the stock price decline. The inves-
tor's expert claimed the press release had to be treated as one disclosure,
that the issuer's stock moved with the industry's other stocks, except
when the issuer issued the corrective press release. Hence, he testified
that the stock price decline was almost entirely attributable to the revela-
tion. The district court denied the certification and the Fifth Circuit
affirmed.129
registration statement. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2006). This action has no causation ele-
ment but reduces damages to the extent the defendant can show loss for reasons other than
the misrepresentation. Since the district court placed the burden of proving loss on the
investors, the Fifth Circuit also vacated the summary judgment with respect to the Securi-
ties Act violations. Alaska Elec. Pension Fund, 572 F.3d at 234-35.
126. 579 F.3d 401 (5th Cir. 2009).
127. Id. at 405.
128. Id. at 408.
129. Id. at 404, 406.
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The Fifth Circuit viewed the situation as a straight application of its
principle developed in Greenberg.130 The investors must show that it is
more probable than not that the corrective statement, and not other un-
related negative statements, caused the significant decline in stock
price. 131 The Fener corrective press release divided itself into three parts,
concerning the overstatement, a coupling with earlier reduction an-
nouncements, and anticipated lower circulation. The only evidence sup-
plied by the investors related to SEC reports, stock-price charts, analyst
reports previously rejected by the Fifth Circuit as well-informed specula-
tion not satisfying the requirements for "loss causation," 3 2 and their ex-
pert's defective report not delineating that portion of the stock price
decline resulting from the corrective statement. Consequently, the inves-
tors did not satisfy the Greenberg rule.133
The Fener opinion emphasizes to defalcating issuer management the
importance of delaying corrective statements until they can mix the cor-
rective statements with other negative news. The procedure will mask
the decline from any stock price decline arising from the corrective dis-
closure. Further, the procedure will provide them with the change that
the investors' expert will be unable to separate out that portion of any
stock price decline from any decline resulting from the other negative
news.
2. Pleading Strong Inference of Scienter Under the PSLRA
Another litigated element of the private securities fraud damage action
deals with the requisite degree of scienter needed to satisfy the strong
inference requirement of the PSLRA.134 In response to the U.S. Su-
preme Court's recent decision in Tellabs,135 the Fifth Circuit has devel-
oped a three-step approach to reviewing scienter allegations: take the
pleadings as true, include referenced documents and materials capable of
judicial notice, and take into account both opposing and supporting plau-
sible inferences. 136
The Fifth Circuit applied this test to an issuer whose alleged misrepre-
sentations contained cautionary statements. In Flaherty & Crumrine Pre-
ferred Income Fund, Inc. v. TXU Corp.,137 the issuer, an electric utility,
made a self-tender for convertible securities at a time when the dividend
rate was low. An earlier May press release indicated that the issuer did
not anticipate a dividend increase until certain benchmarks had been at-
130. Id. at 406-07; see Greenberg v. Crossroads Sys., Inc., 364 F.3d 657, 663 (5th Cir.
2004); see also Flint, supra note 25, at 1156-57 (discussing Greenberg).
131. See Greenberg, 364 F.3d at 666.
132. See Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 271 (5th
Cir. 2007) (per curiam); see also Flint, supra note 63, at 1128 (discussing Oscar).
133. Fener, 579 F.3d at 409-11.
134. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006).
135. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322-24 (2007).
136. See Ind. Elec. Workers' Pension Trust Fund IBEW v. Shaw Group, Inc., 537 F.3d
527, 533 (5th Cir. 2008).
137. 565 F.3d 200 (5th Cir. 2009).
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tained, but the issuer's board might consider other factors in determining
when or if to authorize a dividend increase. In the mid-September self-
tender materials, the issuer disclosed that management was evaluating
whether to recommend that the board reevaluate its dividend policy, but
it indicated that the issuer could not predict the outcome of manage-
ment's evaluation, repeating that the board might consider other fac-
tors.13 8 At a financial firm's conference at the end of September, the
issuer's chief executive officer stated that the dividend policy was under
review. The day before the expiration of the self-tender offer, the issuer's
management requested from the issuer's credit rating agencies an indica-
tion of whether an increase in the dividend would adversely affect its
credit rating. The investors tendered their convertible shares and re-
ceived a price above the then-market value. Six days after the self-tender
offer expired, the issuer's management proposed to the board an increase
in the dividend, and two days later, after having received a favorable re-
sponse from the credit rating agencies, recommended a 350% increase in
the dividend. 139 The next day the board approved the dividend increase.
The issuer publicly announced the increase in dividend three days later
and the stock price immediately rose nearly twenty percent. The inves-
tors who had tendered their convertible securities brought a private se-
curities fraud damage action under Rule 10b-5 and the Texas common
law, claiming the disclosures did not sufficiently disclose the impending
dividend increase. The district court dismissed and the Fifth Circuit
affirmed. 140
The securities issue for the Fifth Circuit in Flaherty & Crumrine Pre-
ferred Income Fund was whether the pleadings and submitted documents
gave rise to a strong inference of scienter. Scienter requires intent to
deceive the investors or severe recklessness in which the danger of mis-
leading investors is known or should have been known. 141 Although the
Fifth Circuit doubted that the alleged misstatements (not adequately dis-
closing the steps taken to increase the dividend) amounted to a material
misrepresentation, 142 the court focused on the two statements for scien-
ter. With respect to the mid-September tender offer materials, the Fifth
Circuit noted that, although the timing of the dividend increase provides
some inference of scienter, timing alone does not establish a strong infer-
138. Id. at 204.
139. Id. at 205.
140. Id. at 203.
141. See R2 Invs. LDC v. Phillips, 401 F.3d 638, 643 (5th Cir. 2005); see also Flint, supra
note 99, at 1559 (discussing R2 Invs.).
142. Flaherty & Crumrine Preferred Income Fund, 565 F.3d at 209 (setting forth inves-
tor's view); id. at 210 (setting forth the court's view); cf. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S.
224, 239 (1988) (rejecting, in the context of materiality, non-disclosure of merger negotia-
tions for disclosure governed by indicia of interest in the transaction by highest corporate
levels). Perhaps "under review" does not provide the shareholder with sufficient informa-
tion to determine whether to tender of not. Cf. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426
U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (noting that materiality for proxy statements is satisfied if "there is a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in decid-
ing how to vote").
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ence.143 With respect to scienter for the late-September conference and
in addition to their petition, the investors had produced a letter of the
issuer's counsel and a report by a finance professor. The counsel's letter
set forth dates of certain events used by the report to show that credit
agencies could not complete their review in the time that management
claimed. The investors contended this report provided evidence that
management knew of the impending dividend increase before the end of
the tender offer. 144 As to motive, the investors relied on the chief execu-
tive officer's possibility of gain as a stockholder and his position to gain
knowledge of the board's intention. The Fifth Circuit did not find the
report and motives as providing a strong inference. 145 The disclosure of
"under review," although vague, accurately disclosed the dividend policy
status. 146 To say more could be deceptive if the board failed to approve
the dividend increase. 147 Also, the Fifth Circuit has previously deter-
mined that the potential for knowledge acquisition by position with the
issuer and the potential for economic gain from stock granted as compen-
sation based on company performance are insufficient to establish a
strong inference of scienter. 148 Furthermore, considering inferences op-
posing the allegations of fraud, as required by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Tellabs, disclosure of dividends "under review" is susceptible of an infer-
ence that the decision to raise the dividend has yet to be made.149
As to the Texas common law fraud claim on the same facts, the Fla-
herty & Crumrine Preferred Income Fund court noted that, with respect
to scienter, securities fraud claim in Texas requires pleading an inference
of either motive or conscious behavior.150 Motives that are universal to
corporations and their officers, as in the instant situation, are insufficient
to allow the inference.151 Position within the issuer, in the absence of
special circumstances such as a one product issuer with few employees,
are insufficient to satisfy the inference of conscious behavior. 152
143. Flaherty & Crumrine Preferred Income Fund, 565 F.3d at 210 (citing another cir-
cuit's district court case, In re Digital Island Sec. Litig., 223 F. Supp. 2d 546, 555-56 (D. Del.
2002), aff'd, 357 F.3d 322 (3d Cir. 2004)). The Fifth Circuit provided no rationale as to why
timing is not sufficient, but under the Tellabs test of consideration of opposing inferences,
timing does not rule out the possible inference of learning of the situation after the
statement.
144. Id. at 209.
145. Id. at 210.
146. Id. at 209.
147. See Susquehanna Corp. v. Pan Am. Sulphur Co., 423 F.2d 1075, 1085-86 (5th Cir.
1970) (stating the tender offeror is not required to make predictions that may make inves-
tors rely on them unjustifiably).
148. Flaherty & Crumrine Preferred Income Fund, 565 F.3d at 208-12; see Ind. Elec.
Workers' Pension Trust Fund IBEW v. Shaw Group, Inc., 537 F.3d 527, 535, 543-44 (5th
Cir. 2008).
149. Id. at 211-12.
150. Id. at 213 (citing Herrmann Holdings Ltd. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 302 F.3d 552, 565
(5th Cir. 2002)).
151. See Herrmann Holdings, 302 F.3d at 565-66.
152. See Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d 333, 342-43 (5th Cir. 2008); see also
Flint, supra note 3, at 1449 (discussing Dorsey).
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The Flaherty & Crumrine Preferred Income Fund opinion reveals the
value to issuer management of including vague cautionary material or
warnings in their disclosures. These statements may provide a non-fraud-
ulent inference defeating the strong inference of scienter required by the
PSLRA.
IV. CONCLUSION
The securities law opinions during this Survey period encompass two
major groups. The first grouping deals with incompetent lawyers or law-
yers who convinced their clients to pay for half-baked arguments.153 In
Miller, a state court reinstated a cease and desist order against an issuer
whose lawyer failed to object to a witness's testimony when a co-defen-
dant's counsel did.154 In In re Next Financial Group, the Texas Supreme
Court granted a mandamus to order arbitration for the termination of a
broker when the arbitration agreement permitted only an exception for
statutory discrimination, not a common law exception to the employ-
ment-at-will doctrine.155 And in In re Perry, a bankruptcy court rejected
claims based on the failure to read the disclosure documents. 156
The Fifth Circuit opinions narrowing the eye of the needle that inves-
tors must thread to be successful in a securities fraud action under the
PSLRA157 constitute the second grouping. Recognizing that this high
hurdle was not intended to prevent viable securities fraud actions, the
Fifth Circuit at least cut some slack for investors. The primary focus was
on "loss causation." Continuing the drive to thwart securities fraud ac-
tions, the Fifth Circuit in Catogas, affirming a dismissal, determined that
for "loss causation," investors must show an immediate decline in the is-
suer's stock price following corrective disclosure. 158 In Fener, the Fifth
Circuit denied class certification, requiring that loss causation requires
separating that portion of the loss stemming from the corrective disclo-
sure from that portion of the loss caused by disclosure of other negative
153. The Fifth Circuit was not immune to the plague of incompetency. In Brunig v.
Clark, 560 F.3d 292 (5th Cir. 2009), Justice Higginbotham dealt with a district court's dis-
missal for failure to plead fraud with particularity for an assignment of an interest in an oil
and gas lease received as an attorney's fee. The perpetrator-client moved to dismiss a
statutory fraud action under the Securities Act and a Rule 10b-5 action under the Ex-
change Act on the grounds that the transaction was exempt from registration under the
Securities Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (2006) (whether or not exempt from registration);
Brunig, 560 F.3d at 295 n.6 (noting the misstatement of the law). The lawyer fared no
better. His unartful and prolix complaint confused the district court, but Justice Higginbot-
ham managed to conclude that he had pled an omission, a misrepresentation, and a strong
inference of scienter, so he reversed the dismissal. See Brunig, 560 F.3d at 296-97. Justice
Higginbotham served as a visiting professor in 2008, and is so serving in 2009, at the same
institution as the author.
154. No. 03-06-00365-CV, 2009 WL 1896075, at *2-4 (Tex. App.-Austin July 1, 2009,
no pet.).
155. 271 S.W.3d 263, 267 (Tex. 2008).
156. 404 B.R. 196, 214 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009).
157. See Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Flowserve Corp., 572 F.3d 221, 235 (5th Cir.
2009) ("eye of the needle").
158. 292 F. App'x 311, 314 (5th Cir. 2008).
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information.' 59 With respect to a strong inference of scienter, the Fifth
Circuit in Flaherty & Crumrine Preferred Income Fund affirmed a dismis-
sal, determining that vague cautionary statements and warnings defeat
the strong inference. 160 In contrast, the Fifth Circuit determined in Lor-
mand that the pleading standard for loss causation is the short and simple
pleading of Rule 8, not the particularity of Rule 9, and that serial disclo-
sure does not defeat a finding of loss causation. 61 In Alaska Electrical
Pension Fund, the Fifth Circuit, in reversing a perpetrator's summary
judgment, held that the disclosure need not be a fact-for-fact disclosure
and that reflecting part of the truth obscured by the fraud is sufficient.162
Other opinions related to a state court finding in Key Energy Services
that an issuer need not issue shares in violation of the securities laws (ab-
sence of a registration statement) under an employee option plan before
the options expire. In Enron, a federal district court temporarily
thwarted an attempt to impose the federal loss causation element on an
action under the TSFA.
159. 579 F.3d 401, 404, 406 (5th Cir. 2009).
160. 565 F.3d 200, 203 (5th Cir. 2009).
161. 565 F.3d, 228, 255-58 (5th Cir. 2009).
162. 572 F.3d 221, 230 (5th Cir. 2009).
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